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The objective of this research is to map the international investment agreements (IIAs) concluded by Group of Twenty (G20) 
countries, examining whether there is a common thread between those countries with respect to investment protection and 
especially the G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking. For that purpose, the most important provisions on 
investment protection were examined in all available IIAs across all G20 countries. These include the scope and definition of 
investment and investors; the existence of establishment or pre-establishment commitments; standards of treatment and their 
limitations; and the main standards of protection, like expropriation, transfers, and umbrella clauses. Finally, we examined the 
presence of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions and their limitations. At the same time, we mapped the presence 
of the Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking in existing IIAs concluded by G20 countries.
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1The Group of Twenty (G20), is a forum for international 
economic cooperation and decision-making among the 
governments of the 20 major economies. It consists of 19 
individual countries – Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States 
(US) – together with the European Union (EU).1 
The G20 started as a meeting of Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors that took place in Berlin on 15-16 December 
1999, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. Almost a 
decade later, on 14-15 November 2008, the first G20 Leaders' 
Summit was held in Washington DC, during the US subprime 
mortgage crisis.2 Currently, G20 heads of government or heads 
of state meet annually with a view to studying, reviewing, and 
promoting high-level discussion of policy issues pertaining to 
the promotion of international financial stability. In addition, 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meet regularly 
during the year to discuss ways to strengthen the global 
economy, reform international financial institutions, improve 
financial regulation, and discuss the key economic reforms 
that are needed in each of the member countries.3  
Together, the G20 economies account for two-thirds of 
the world population, about 85 percent of the gross world 
product, and 80 percent of world trade (or 75 percent, 
excluding EU intra-trade).4 In 2015, the G20 countries 
generated more than three-quarters of global GDP and 
attracted half of global world foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows (although nearly two-thirds of the total inflows were 
concentrated only in the US, China, and Brazil) and some 58 
percent of global FDI stock is invested in the G20 (US$14.4 
trillion). Intra-investment is a significant source of FDI within 
the G20, accounting for an annual inflow average of 42 
percent in the last five years. The G20 economies are home to 
more than 95 percent of the Fortune Global 500 companies.5 
G20 countries represent an important part of the universe 
of international investment agreements (IIAs), accounting 
for 1574 treaties (about 44 percent of a total of 3583 IIAs),6 
including 1290 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 284 
treaties with investment provisions (TIPs), which include 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with investment 
chapters, usually free trade agreements (FTAs).7 
Following their meeting in Shanghai on 9-10 July 2016, 
G20 trade ministers issued a statement reinforcing their 
determination to promote inclusive, robust, and sustainable 
trade and investment growth, and agreed on nine “G20 
Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking,” 
established as a result of discussions within the G20 Trade 
and Investment Working Group, to foster an open, transparent 
global policy environment that is  conducive for investment 
and promoting coherence in national and international 
investment policymaking and inclusive economic growth and 
sustainable development. These principles are: 
I. Governments should avoid protectionism in relation to 
cross-border investment.
II. Investment policies should establish open, non-
discriminatory, transparent, and predictable conditions for 
investment.
III. Investment policies should provide legal certainty and 
strong protection to investors and investments, tangible 
and intangible, including access to effective mechanisms 
for the prevention and settlement of disputes, as well as to 
enforcement procedures. Dispute settlement procedures 
should be fair, open, and transparent, with appropriate 
safeguards to prevent abuse.
IV. Regulation relating to investment should be developed 
in a transparent manner with the opportunity for 
all stakeholders to participate, and embedded in an 
institutional framework based on the rule of law.
V. Investment policies and other policies that impact on 
investment should be coherent at both the national and 
international levels and aimed at fostering investment, 
consistent with the objectives of sustainable development 
and inclusive growth.
VI. Governments reaffirm the right to regulate investment for 
legitimate public policy purposes.
VII. Policies for investment promotion should be effective and 
efficient, aimed at attracting and retaining investment, 
and matched by facilitation efforts that promote 
transparency and are conducive for investors to establish, 
conduct and expand their businesses.
INTRODUCTION
B20 Coalition, "What Is G-20| G-20 Members| G-20 Presidency| G-20 
Functioning" (August 2016) <http://www.b20coalition.org/about-G-20.
php> accessed 12 September 2016.
Kirton, John J. 2016. G20 Governance for a Globalized World. New York: 
Routledge 
G-20, "About G-20 - G-20 - China 2016" (August 2016) <http://
www.G-20.org/English/aboutG-20/About G-20/201511/t20151127_1609.
html> accessed 12 September 2016.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2016. "Investor 
Nationality: Policy Challenges." In World Investment Report 2016, by 
UNCTAD, 124-193. New York: UNCTAD.
The universe of known IIAs at the time of this report is a total of 3583, 
including 3155 BITs and 428 TIPs. SNIS Project ‘Diffusion of International 
Law: A Textual Analysis of International Investment Agreements’.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Investment Policy 
Hub. Accessed September 12, 2016. http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.
org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu
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2VIII. Investment policies should promote and facilitate the 
observance by investors of international best practices and 
applicable instruments of responsible business conduct 
and corporate governance.
IX. International community should continue to cooperate 
and engage in dialogue with a view to maintaining an 
open and conducive policy environment for investment, 
and to address shared investment policy challenges.
against expropriation (including standards of compensation, 
and protection against indirect expropriation), free transfers of 
funds (and the presence of exceptions like balance of payments 
difficulties), and umbrella clauses. Finally, we examined ISDS 
provisions and whether they were limited by MFN clauses.
The purpose of this study is to map the IIAs currently concluded 
by G20 economies, with the goal of examining whether there is 
a common thread between those countries regarding investment 
protection. For that purpose, core provisions on investment 
protection were examined in all available IIAs of G20 countries. 
These provisions include the scope and definition of both 
investment and investors; the presence of establishment or pre-
establishment commitments; standards of treatment — national 
treatment (NT); most-favoured nation (MFN); full protection 
and security (FPS); and fair and equitable treatment (FET). They 
also include the main standards of protection, like protection 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
– METHODOLOGY
Country
Number 
of IIAs
BITs TIPs Main Source
Argentina 60 58 2
Electronic Database of 
Investment Treaties
Australia 42 23 19
Electronic Database of 
Investment Treaties
Brazil 23 20 3
Electronic Database of 
Investment Treaties
Canada8 36 31 5 UNCTAD Mapping
China 160 142 18
Electronic Database of 
Investment Treaties
EU9 3 0 3
Electronic Database of 
Investment Treaties
France10 91 90 1 UNCTAD Mapping
Germany11 109 108 1 UNCTAD Mapping
India 88 83 5
Electronic Database of 
Investment Treaties
Indonesia 76 70 6
Electronic Database of 
Investment Treaties
Italy12 66 66 0 UNCTAD Mapping
Country
Number 
of IIAs
BITs TIPs Main Source
Japan 42 27 15
Electronic Database of 
Investment Treaties
Mexico13 30 26 4 UNCTAD Mapping
Russia 81 79 2
Electronic Database of 
Investment Treaties
Saudi Arabia 33 22 11
Electronic Database of 
Investment Treaties
South Africa 48 47 1
Electronic Database of 
Investment Treaties
South Korea 102 95 7
Electronic Database of 
Investment Treaties
Turkey 98 95 3
Electronic Database of 
Investment Treaties
United 
Kingdom14
92 92 0 UNCTAD Mapping
United  
States15
49 47 2 UNCTAD Mapping
Total 1326 1221 108
TABLE 1:
Descriptive statistics of the data set
Canadian IIAs mapped by UNCTAD, do not include 12 BITs and 7 PTAs 
with investment chapters. Manual mapping of NAFTA, the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) was added to the data.
The EU has not concluded BITs as a Union, although its members have 
concluded a large number of these treaties. The EU has recently concluded 
negotiations of PTAs with investment chapters with Canada (CETA), 
Singapore, and Viet Nam, which were manually mapped for this study.
French IIAs mapped by UNCTAD, does not include 25 BITs. The Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) was manually mapped and added to the data.
German IIAs mapped by UNCTAD, does not 47 include BITs. The ECT was 
manually mapped and added to the data.
Italy IIAs mapped by UNCTAD, do not include 38 BITs. On 31 December 
2014, Italy notified its withdrawal from the ECT. Under Article 47(2) of the 
ECT, any such withdrawal shall take effect upon the expiry of one year after 
the date of the receipt of the notification by the Depositary. Therefore, the 
withdrawal from the ECT by Italy took effect on 1 January 2016. 
Mexican IIAs mapped by UNCTAD, do not include eight BITs and seven 
PTAs with investment chapters. Manual mapping of NAFTA and the TPP 
was added to the data.
UK IIAs mapped by UNCTAD, do not include eight BITs. The ECT was 
manually mapped and added to the data.
US IIAs mapped by UNCTAD, do not include 23 BITs and 13 PTAs with 
investment chapters. Manual mapping of NAFTA and the TPP was added 
to the data.
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3At the same time, we mapped the presence of the Guiding 
Principles for Global Investment Policymaking in existing 
IIAs concluded by G20 countries. For that purpose, we 
equated each principle with the presence of certain 
provisions in IIAs that share the same objectives, as follows:
• Principle I: Performance requirements
• Principle II: NT, MFN, and transparency
• Principle III: Prevention of disputes, “enhanced” ISDS
• Principle IV: Transparency
• Principle V: Sustainable development
• Principle VI: Right to regulate
• Principle VII: Investment promotion
• Principle VIII: Corporate social responsibility
• Principle IX: Technical cooperation/capacity building
The data set used in this research was composed of BITs 
and PTAs with investment chapters or similar agreements 
concluded by G20 countries that are publicly available, 
taken from the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) database,16 together with 
the World Trade Institute (WTI) Electronic Database of 
Investment Treaties (EDIT), funded by the Swiss Network 
for International Studies (SNIS) with texts not available 
at UNCTAD.17 The mapping was done on the official 
texts of agreements concluded before September 2016, 
regardless of whether they were in force.18 When the text 
was not available in English, the study of IIAs was done 
by researchers or research assistants knowledgeable of 
both investment law and the language of the agreement. 
The mapping was double-coding performed to try to get 
concordance among the mappers.
IIAs from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey were mapped 
manually, using texts publicly available from those 
countries. Information from North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) member states (Canada, Mexico, and 
the US), as well as from the EU (France, Germany, Italy, 
and the UK), was taken from the UNCTAD’s IIA Mapping 
Project,19 which includes a substantive (but only partial) 
mapping of those countries. This approach was taken, 
owing to the large number of IIAs from both NAFTA and EU 
member countries. The total numbers of IIAs mapped for 
this study are listed below.
ibid.
Swiss Network for International Studies. 2015. "Diffusion of International 
Law: A Textual Analysis of International Investment Agreements". Swiss 
Network for International Studies. Accessed September 12, 2016. http://
www.snis.ch/project_diffusion-international-law-textual-analysis-
international-investment-agreements
As the purpose of the study is to identify the common trends in the 
negotiation of IIAs across G20 countries; terminated and renegotiated IIAs 
were also included in the sample.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Investment Policy 
Hub. Accessed September 12, 2016. http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.
org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu
16
17
18
19
There is a great discrepancy between G20 countries in 
terms of the numbers of IIAs they have concluded so far. 
While some countries, mostly EU member states (France, 
Germany, and the UK) as well as China and South Korea 
have signed about 100 BITs; other G20 countries (like 
Australia, Brazil, Japan, and Saudi Arabia) have concluded 
substantively fewer agreements. 
Some G20 countries also have important differences 
with respect of the ratification of IIAs. The prime example 
is Brazil, which has concluded 20 BITs — including in 
this group the Cooperation and Facilitation Investment 
Agreements (CFIAs) negotiated in the last two years but 
has none of those treaties in force. Only South Africa has 
a higher rate of treaties that are not in force (25 of 40), 
followed by Indonesia (39 of 71). In contrast, Australian IIAs 
are all in force, with the sole exception of the TPP. 
SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
Almost all G20 countries usually have included definitions 
of investment as an open list of assets in their IIAs. We 
found the same trend even in treaties recently concluded, 
such as the CETA and the TPP. The practice of defining 
investment as a closed list of assets or enterprises is rare 
and is mostly found among NAFTA signatories, notably 
Canada (38 percent of all mapped Canadian IIAs) and 
Mexico (14 percent of all mapped Mexican IIAs).
However, definitions that rely on open lists of assets 
usually include certain qualifications. First, the majority 
of G20 countries require the investment be made in 
accordance with the host state’s laws and regulations (60 
percent of the sample). Only the US, the UK, Japan, and 
COMMON THREADS 
ON G20 INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS
4FIGURE 1:
Definitions of investment
FIGURE 2:
Treaties that set out closed exhaustive list of covered assets
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LEGEND:
Asset-based definition 
Enterprise-based definition
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Yes
No
Not applicable
Germany usually do not include such a requirement in their 
agreements. 
Second, some G20 countries have followed the trend of 
the CETA and the TPP to limit the scope of investment by 
defining certain characteristics of the investment. This 
feature is particularly applied by Japan (in 26 percent of its 
IIAs); followed by Mexico (in 21 percent of its mapped IIAs); 
and Australia (in 19 percent of its IIAs).
With respect to the definition of investor, another 
important element that delineates the scope of application 
of an IIA, it is a common practice of G20 countries (also in 
the CETA and NAFTA) to define investors as nationals (97 
percent), including in that definition natural persons and 
legal entities. With respect to double nationality, Australia 
(96 percent of its IIAs) and Canada (43 percent of its 
mapped IIAs) are the primary G20 countries that follow the 
CETA limitation to exclude dual nationals or dual citizens 
from the protections of the IIAs.
Another frequent limitation to the definition of investor 
is the inclusion of provisions that clarify the thresholds of 
ownership and control of legal entities to be considered a 
foreign investor (61 percent of G20 countries). In the same 
line, 61 percent of IIAs concluded by G20 countries include 
the additional requirement of having substantial business 
activities (as for example is found in the CETA), or the place 
of principal seat (as is found in several German BITs).
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FIGURE 3:
Treaties that define certain characteristics of investment
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FIGURE 4:
Definition of investor
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FIGURE 5:
Treaties that exclude dual nationals from definition of investor
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6FIGURE 6:
Treaties that define ownership and control of legal entities
FIGURE 7:
Treaties that include requirement of substantial business activity
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7FIGURE 8:
Treaties that include a prohibition on performance requirements
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G20 GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR GLOBAL 
INVESTMENT
Principle I: Avoid protectionism in relation to cross-border 
investment 
Approximately 65 percent of the G20 countries include a 
non-binding provision with respect to establishment, while 
only four of the G20 countries (Australia, Canada Japan, 
and the US) extend the protections of the treaty to the pre-
establishment phase, a feature that is also found in the ECT, 
NAFTA, the CETA, and the TPP. The extension of NT and 
MFN provisions in both pre- and post-establishment phases 
is examined in the following sections together with those 
standards of treatment.
Only 16 percent of the G20 countries provide for an explicit 
prohibition of performance requirements (PRs) in their IIAs 
(100 percent of US IIAs, 92 percent of Canadian IIAs, 76 
percent of Japanese IIAs, 28 percent of Italian IIAs, 21 percent 
of French IIAs, 21 percent of Mexican IIAs, 19 percent of 
Australian IIAs and 15 percent of South Korean IIAs). Since 
this prohibition is also found in NAFTA, the CETA, and the 
TPP, it can be assumed that countries that often require pre-
establishment commitments also require a prohibition on 
PRs.
Principle II: Open, non-discriminatory, transparent, and 
predictable conditions for investment.
Most of the G20 countries apply a broad and unqualified 
NA provision in their IIAs (59 percent). Not only European 
countries follow this trend, but also Argentina, Brazil, India, 
LEGEND:
Yes
No
FIGURE 9:
Types of national treatment clauses
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NT with circumstances 
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8South Korea, and the Russia Federation. It is the practice 
of only six of the G20 countries to limit the NT provision 
to "in like circumstances" (as considered in NAFTA) or "in 
like situations" (as considered in the CETA). The US has 
negotiated in all its IIAs an NT clause that is limited to "in like 
circumstances" and is followed closely by Japan, Mexico, and 
Turkey as well as to a lesser extent Canada. 
In contrast, about 16 percent of the IIAs concluded by G20 
countries do not include NT provisions. Indonesia (58 
percent) and China (55 percent) have the highest number of 
treaties that do not provide NT to foreign investors in their 
IIAs. 
Unlike NAFTA, the CETA, and the TPP, most IIAs concluded 
by G20 countries do not extend the scope of NT to the pre-
establishment phase. Only the US and Canada have most 
of their treaties negotiated with an NT clause that covers 
both pre- and post-establishment. Some countries limit the 
scope of NT in the post-establishment phase to only certain 
matters and/or sectors (Japan, Russian Federation, and Saudi 
Arabia). Recent EU PTAs, like the CETA and the EU-Viet Nam 
FTA, also cover the pre-establishment phase, but ISDS is not 
allowed on claims based on market access restrictions. 
Half of the G20 countries apply a broad unqualified MFN 
clause (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Indonesia, 
Russian Federation, South Korea, Turkey, and the US). This 
is different from what is found in NAFTA, the CETA, and 
the TPP, which limit the scope of the application of MFN 
treatment to "in like circumstances" or "in like situations" 
and only to certain matters and/or sectors. Moreover, unlike 
NAFTA, the CETA, and the TPP, it is not a common practice 
FIGURE 10:
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FIGURE 11:
Most-favoured nation exclusion of investor-state dispute settlement
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9of G20 countries to extend the MFN treatment provision 
to the pre-establishment phase. The countries with the 
largest number of treaties that include such clauses are 
those concluded by the US, Canada, and to a lesser extent, 
Australia and PTAs recently negotiated by the EU, like the 
CETA and the EU-Viet Nam FTA.
Although the CETA and the EU-Viet Nam FTA, as well as the 
TPP, exclude ISDS from the operation of the MFN provision, 
this practice is not widely applied by the G20 countries. Japan 
and Canada exclude procedural issues from MFN treatment 
in approximately 20 percent of their IIAs, followed by Brazil, 
Turkey, and Mexico in approximately 10 percent of their IIAs.
Most G20 countries include an unqualified FET standard in 
their IIAs (80 percent). Only 10 percent of G20 countries 
link FET to international minimum standards of treatment 
(Canada, France, Mexico, and the US) as in the TPP. The two 
countries with the highest number of IIAs that do not consider 
FET to foreign investors in their investment treaties are Brazil 
and Turkey.
In addition to NAFTA and the TPP, about 82 percent of 
G20 countries’ IIAs provide FPS to foreign investors. Brazil, 
India, Italy, and Turkey have the highest number of treaties 
without any FPS guarantee. Furthermore, the FPS standard is 
sometimes referred to as “protection”, “legal protection”, or 
“physical protection”, such as in the CETA, 60 percent of South 
African IIAs, 60 percent of Indonesian IIAs, and 39 percent of 
Chinese IIAs. A further limitation is provided by the Russian 
IIAs (61 percent of its IIAs), which require the FPS standard to 
be in accordance with national laws.
FIGURE 12:
Fair and equitable treatment clauses
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FIGURE 13:
Full protection and security provisions
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Principle III: Prevention and settlement of disputes
The common practice of all G20 countries is to include ISDS 
provisions in their IIAs, usually under the form of investor-
state arbitration. The CETA and the EU-Viet Nam FTA include 
a novel standing investment tribunal and an appellate tribunal. 
However, there are few IIAs that do not include an ISDS 
provision at all. From all the investment treaties that were 
mapped, only 40 agreements (4 percent) do not provide an 
ISDS clause. The large majority of this group is made up of 
association, cooperation, and framework agreements. Some 
agreements are already terminated (nine of the sample) 
and several are not yet in force (like the CFIAs concluded by 
Brazil in 2015 and 2016). 65 percent of Brazilian IIAs include 
an ISDS provision – all Brazilian BITs and the MERCOSUR 
internal protocol. The MERCOSUR external protocol considers 
consultations only in case of disputes between investors and 
host states. It is important to highlight that ISDS is not included 
in any of the seven IIAs signed by Brazil since 2015, where only 
consultations and direct negotiations are considered as dispute 
settlement mechanisms, with an ombudsman established in 
each contracting party as a point of contact.
In few cases, the ISDS is limited to certain disputes. NAFTA 
(with respect to Canada and Mexico); the CETA; the TPP (with 
respect to Canada and Mexico) and 12 percent of Chinese IIAs 
exclude admission disputes from ISDS. The TPP also excludes 
permanent residents from a contracting party from ISDS, 
and Australia and New Zealand have negotiated an overall 
exclusion of ISDS under a side letter of the TPP. Another 
limitation to ISDS can be found in 8 percent of Australian IIAs 
that require the investor to exhaust local remedies before 
turning to international arbitration. All G20 IIAs include inter-
state dispute settlement mechanisms.
FIGURE 14:
Treaties that include investor-state dispute settlement
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FIGURE 15:
Alternatives to arbitration
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There are almost no IIAs concluded by G20 countries that 
include compulsory alternative dispute resolution (ADR) — 
conciliation/mediation. From the mapped agreements, only 
the 2009 ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA makes such 
dispute resolution compulsory. Voluntary ADR mechanisms 
are found in very few IIAs of these countries, notably: the US 
(in 15 agreements representing 31 percent of its IIAs); Australia 
(in 13 agreements, representing 31 percent of its IIAs); Japan 
(in 13 agreements, representing 31 percent of its IIAs); Brazil 
(in 7 agreements, representing 30 percent of its IIAs); India 
(in 8 agreements, representing 9 percent of its IIAs); and the 
Russian Federation. Only six Russian IIAs (7 percent) include a 
voluntary alternative to dispute resolution (the 2013 not yet 
in force Guatemala-Russia BIT, the 1994 India-Russia BIT, the 
1998 Japan-Russia BIT, the 1989 Netherlands-Russia BIT, the 
1992 not yet in force Russia-USA BIT, and the 2015 not yet in 
force Eurasian Economic Union-Viet Nam FTA). South Korea 
includes this type of provision in five agreements, representing 
5 percent of its IIAs). 
At the other extreme, Canada, and Turkey include these 
provisions in only two agreements, and Indonesia, India, 
Mexico, and the UK in only one.
Principle IV: Transparency
G20 IIAs include transparency provisions, both directed to 
states (obligations to publish laws and regulations), and to 
investors (e.g., a treaty authorises the host states to collect 
from investors information about their corporate governance, 
or any other information, including for informational or 
statistical purposes). However, both types of obligations 
are not equally prevalent in the G20 universe of investment 
agreements. 
FIGURE 16:
Provisions directed at states to publish laws and regulations
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FIGURE 17:
Transparency provisions directed at investors
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Transparency provisions directed to states are found in about 
18 percent of the treaties, notably in those concluded by the 
US (86 percent); Canada (83 percent); Japan (52 percent); 
Australia (50 percent); Brazil (30 percent); Mexico (20 
percent); and in the recent eight agreements concluded by 
the EU. These provisions are notoriously less present in the 
IIAs concluded by India (11 percent); South Korea (9 percent); 
Argentina (7 percent); Russian Federation (6 percent); Turkey 
(6 percent); Italy (5 percent); and China (5 percent). Finally, 
only one treaty concluded by France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, 
and the UK included obligations to the state to publish laws 
and regulations, and none are found in South African IIAs.
In contrast, transparency obligations directed at investors 
are less present than those directed at states in the universe 
of G20 IIAs. Only Mexico (27 percent) and the Russian 
Federation (16 percent) have an important number of 
agreements including those provisions. Yet, the obligation of 
the contracting states to publish all laws and regulations is not 
common in Russian investment treaty practice. Only 13 of 82 
Russian IIAs have such a transparency requirement.
Other countries that include these provisions are Japan 
(14 percent); South Korea (11 percent); the US (8 percent); 
Australia (7 percent); and India (7 percent). Only four South 
African IIAs are in compliance with Principle IV to publish 
laws and regulations (the 1998 Russia-South Africa BIT, the 
1998 South Africa-Sweden BIT, the 2006 SADC Investment 
Protocol, and the 1995 not yet in force Canada-South Africa 
BIT). Among Saudi Arabia’s agreements, only the Saudi – Japan 
BIT (2013) requires states to publish their laws. 
All other G20 countries have statistically irrelevant 
agreements with these provisions, or almost none, as is the 
case for Brazil, Italy, and the UK.
Principle V: Sustainable development
The consideration of sustainable development provisions or 
sustainable development principles is scarce in the investment 
treaty practice of G20 countries.
Reference to sustainable development is rarely found in the 
preamble of these agreements. Although it is found in 30 
percent of the Brazilian IIAs, all of them correspond to the new 
type of agreements that have been signed since 2015, and in 
the eight agreements recently concluded by the EU, none 
of them is in force yet. Canada is the main country including 
this reference in the preamble of 39 percent of its investment 
treaties, followed from afar by Japan (10 percent); South Korea 
(6 percent); Mexico (6 percent); and India (3 percent). In this 
country, references to sustainable development are found 
in only three agreements (the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, 
the 2011 India-Japan EPA, and the 2005 India-Singapore 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA). 
Among all Chinese IIAs, sustainable development appears 
only in the Republic of Korea-China FTA (2015). Similarly, in 
the case of Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, the only agreement 
that provides for a sustainable development clause is the 
1981 Indonesia-Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 
Investment Agreement.
No reference to sustainable development is found in IIAs 
concluded by Argentina, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, 
Russian Federation, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, or the US. 
Provisions of not lowering environmental or labour standards 
are less unusual in the G20 IIAs universe and are included in 
50 percent of Canadian IIAs and 48 percent of Japanese IIAs. 
Other countries that include these clauses in their investment 
treaties but on a lower scale are Brazil (13 percent); Mexico (13 
percent); South Korea (8 percent); Italy (8 percent); France (7 
FIGURE 18:
References to sustainable development
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percent); the US (6 percent); the UK (5 percent); Germany (4 
percent); India (4 percent); and Turkey (4 percent). 
Article 9.16 of the TPP (that would bind Australia, Canada, 
Japan, and the US), also includes a statement that nothing 
in the investment chapter shall be construed to prevent a 
party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure 
otherwise consistent with it, that it considers appropriate to 
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken 
in a manner sensitive to environmental, health, or other 
regulatory objectives.
Principle VI: Right to regulate
Reference to the “right to regulate” or similarly to regulatory 
autonomy, policy space, or flexibility to introduce new 
regulations, are scarcely found in IIAs concluded by G20 
countries, in either the preamble or the main provisions of the 
treaty.
At the preamble level, these references are found only in 
the agreements concluded by Brazil (13 percent); Canada 
(8 percent); South Korea (2 percent); and in single treaties 
concluded by France and Mexico. 
References to right to regulate are more often found in the 
binding parts of G20 investment agreements, notably in the 
treaties concluded by Brazil (13 percent); Japan (7 percent); 
the US (4 percent); South Korea (2 percent); and in the eight 
agreements recently concluded by the EU. There are also only 
3 Indian agreements that reaffirm the state’s right to regulate 
(the 2007 India-Trinidad and Tobago BIT, the 2011 India-
Malaysia FTA, and the 2005 India-Singapore CECA). 
From all Australian and Chinese IIAs, only the Australia-China 
FTA (2015) explicitly included the state’s right to regulate. 
Only in the 2015 not yet in force BIT between the Eurasian 
Economic Union (the Russian Federation is a member) and 
Viet Nam, the host state’s right to regulate for a legitimate 
public purpose is recognised. Similarly, the only South African 
agreement that provides for a right to regulate clause is the 
2006 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Investment Protocol. A similar reference is found in one BIT 
concluded by Turkey and France, respectively. No Saudi treaty 
included this feature.
Principle VII: Investment promotion/facilitation
References to specific investment promotion activities – 
outside the preamble, or the title of the agreement, are found 
in several G20 IIAs, notably in those concluded by Brazil (30 
percent); Japan (26 percent); Mexico (20 percent); Canada 
(19 percent); Italy (17 percent); the UK (17 percent); China (16 
percent); India (16 percent); South Korea (13 percent); Australia 
(12 percent); and Germany (11 percent). Other countries 
with fewer investment agreements with explicit provisions 
on investment promotion include Argentina (8 percent); 
France (8 percent); Turkey (6 percent); Russian Federation (5 
percent); and the US (4 percent).
Only one South African investment treaty includes provisions 
on investment promotion (the 1998 BIT with Spain), and 
none is found in the agreements concluded by Saudi Arabia.
The practice of including an investment facilitation clause is 
also not very common in G20 IIAs. For example, only 2 of 89 
Indian investment treaties include such a clause (the 2013 
India-United Arab Emirates (UAE) BIT and the 2014 not yet 
in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement). Investment 
facilitation is included in only five Indonesian IIAs (6 
percent): the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment 
Agreement, the 2009 ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, 
FIGURE 19:
References to the right to regulate
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the 2009 Indonesia-ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement, the 1981 Indonesia-OIC Investment Agreement, 
and the terminated 1968 Indonesia-Netherlands BIT. 
Investment facilitation is also available in only one Japanese 
treaty: the 2005 Japan-Malaysia EPA.
Principle VIII: Corporate social responsibility
The mention of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is rarely 
found in G20 IIAs, considering the preamble and main body 
of the text.
At a preambular level, only three Indian treaties (with 
Austria, the Czech Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago) 
mention CSR. When it comes to the text of the agreement, 
only the treaties concluded by Canada (28 percent), 
followed by a long distance by Mexico (6 percent); Japan 
(5 percent); South Korea (2 percent) and the most recent 
seven agreements concluded by the EU, include references 
to principles of CSR. The only South African agreement that 
provides for a CSR clause is the 2006 SADC Investment 
Protocol.
Only the French BIT with Colombia (2014) and the US BIT 
with Belarus (1994) include this type of provision. The 
Australian, Saudi Arabian, and Chinese IIAs do not refer to 
the principles of CSR.
Article 9.17 of the TPP (that would bind Australia, Canada, 
Japan, and the US), includes a statement that the parties 
reaffirm the importance of each party encouraging enterprises 
operating within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction 
to voluntarily incorporate into their internal policies those 
internationally recognised standards, guidelines, and principles 
of CSR that have been endorsed or are supported by that party.
Principle IX: Technical cooperation/capacity building
References to activities of technical cooperation or capacity 
building are found only in some G20 IIAs, notably in those 
concluded by Brazil (26 percent) and Mexico (13 percent). 
Other G20 countries have relatively few treaties including 
these provisions. These include Italy (9 percent); Australia 
(7 percent); France (7 percent); Germany (6 percent); the UK 
(6 percent); Japan (5 percent); Canada (5 percent); Turkey 
(4 percent); the US (4 percent); and the Russian Federation 
(2 percent).
OTHER STANDARDS OF PROTECTION 
Almost all G20 countries guarantee free transfer of funds in 
their IIAs. Half of them frequently guarantee an unlimited 
free transfer of funds without considering any exception. The 
other half subject the guarantee of free transfer of funds to 
few exemptions, such as in the case of balance of payments 
difficulties or demanding compliance from an investor to 
protect the creditors. The countries that provide for exceptions 
to the free transfer of funds are generally the US, the EU, 
Canada, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, Indonesia, Australia, 
and France. The same approach has been applied in the ECT, 
NAFTA, the CETA, and the TPP. Another type of exception to 
free transfer of funds could be found in 69 percent of South 
African IIAs, which exclude permanent residents that possess 
the nationality of the contracting party from this protection.
An umbrella clause is found in an important number of IIAs 
concluded by G20 countries (58 percent). These include 
Germany (83 percent); South Africa (83 percent); the UK (79 
percent); and South Korea (79 percent).
FIGURE 20:
Mention of corporate social responsibility
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FIGURE 22:
Treaties that include an umbrella clause
FIGURE 21:
Treaties that include free transfer of funds
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FIGURE 23:
Treaties that mention indirect expropriation of assets
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See, for example, EU-Iraq Cooperation Agreement, EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement, EU-Georgia Association Agreement, EU-Moldova Association 
Agreement, and the EU-Kazakhstan Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement. 
20
After analysing the investment treaties concluded by the G20 
countries, we can characterise the common threads of their 
agreements. Following the findings described in the preceding 
sections, an average G20 country IIA would include the 
features described below: 
a) Scope of application 
Investment is defined as every kind of asset, including a non-
exhaustive list of covered assets and does not require certain 
characteristics of the investment. 
Investors are defined as natural persons who are nationals or 
citizens of the contracting party and judicial entities with their 
place of incorporation in the contracting party. 
b) Promotion and Admission 
The admission clause merely requires a non-binding 
establishment in accordance with contracting parties’ 
domestic laws and regulations.  
c) Standards of Treatment
The NT standard covers only investments in the post-
establishment phase and is broadly defined without 
reference to "in like circumstances."
CONCLUSION
It is widely accepted among the G20 countries to provide 
compensation for expropriation in accordance with the “Hull 
Formula” ("prompt, adequate, and effective"), a feature that 
is also found in multi-party agreements like the ECT, NAFTA, 
the CETA and the TPP. Some G20 countries (20 percent) have 
a greater number of treaties that provide an exception to 
compensation for expropriation to protect the public welfare 
(56 percent of mapped Canadian IIAs, 23 percent of Indian IIAs, 
17 percent of Japanese IIAs, and 12 percent of Turkish IIAs). 
All BITs concluded by G20 countries provide protection to 
foreign investors in case of indirect expropriation, and this is 
also the general rule in multi-party agreements like the ECT, 
NAFTA, the CETA, and the TPP. The only limited exception 
where this provision is not included is in some EU Association 
or Cooperation Agreements.20 Another small number of 
treaties exclude measures taken for a public purpose from 
the compensatory indirect expropriation (49 percent of 
Canadian IIAs and 22 percent of German IIAs), while other 
treaties exempt compulsory licenses in accordance with WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) from the scope of expropriation (the CETA, the 
TPP, and 78 percent of Canadian IIAs). 
The MFN treatment standard only stretches to investments 
in the post-establishment phase and is limited to 
investments and investors "in like circumstances" and 
certain sectors. Moreover, the ISDS is not excluded from 
the scope of the MFN treatment. 
An unqualified FET standard is included without reference 
to customary international law.
The FPS standard is also included without any further 
qualifications. 
d) Standards of Protection 
The free transfer of funds is guaranteed without any further 
exceptions for financial difficulties and/or protection of 
creditors.  
A prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for 
expropriation is provided (Hull formula), including 
compensation for indirect expropriation without any 
exceptions, such as measures adopted for a public policy 
objective or compulsory licenses under TRIPS. 
An umbrella clause is not included in the treaty. Similarly, 
there is no clause that prohibits performance requirements. 
e) ISDS
The treaty provides for ISDS without any exemptions for 
certain disputes or investors and ISDS mechanisms.
With respect to the application of the guiding principles for 
global policymaking, we can conclude that is very different 
throughout the G20 countries, with a clear difference 
between principles that correspond to a more traditional 
content of investment treaties (Principle I: performance 
requirements; Principle II: NT, MFN, and transparency; 
and Principle III: prevention of disputes, “enhanced” 
ISDS), which are largely followed, with respect to more 
novel principles (Principle IV: transparency; Principle V: 
sustainable development; Principle VI: right to regulate; 
Principle VII: investment promotion; Principle VIII: CSR; 
and Principle IX: technical cooperation/capacity building), 
that are largely pending complete implementation, with 
important differences across G20 countries.
It would be very interesting to see how G20 countries 
will implement these principles. Are they planning to 
renegotiate the investment agreements they already have, 
or just include them in future ones? If the latter is the case, 
these principles will have very limited scope, as several 
of the G20 countries have concluded a large number of 
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investment treaties. This will be undoubtedly a "policy 
feast" of sorts.21 
Adequate implementation will be key not only for effective 
harmonisation or policy convergence around these 
principles across G20 countries, but also for non-G20 
countries, especially for developing and less advantaged 
economies that will need to see that the largest economies 
of the world preach by example and include these principles 
in future negotiations and renegotiations of investment 
agreements.
Ana Novik, "G20 Serves an Appetiser to a Potential Investment Policy 
Feast" (OECD Insights Blog, 13 July 2016) <https://oecdinsights.
org/2016/07/13/g20-serves-an-appetiser-to-a-potential-investment-
policy-feast/> accessed 31 October 2016.
21
Implemented jointly by ICTSD and the World Economic 
Forum, the E15Initiative was established to convene 
world-class experts and institutions to generate strategic 
analysis and recommendations for government, business, 
and civil society geared towards strengthening the 
global trade and investment system for sustainable 
development.
Implemented jointly by ICTSD and the World Economic 
Forum, the E15Initiative convenes world-class experts 
and institutions to generate strategic analysis and 
recommendations for government, business and civil 
society geared towards strengthening the global trade 
system.
